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The Recognition of Panama

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


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# THE RECOGNITION *of* PANAMA

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## THE RECOGNITION OF PANAMA.

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In order to discuss intelligently the action of the administration toward the Republic of Colombia, it is necessary first to know the facts, and I will endeavor to state these briefly.

The treaty of 1846 between the United States and New Granada, in the words of Secretary Hay, "is not dependent for its efficacy on the *personnel* of the signers or the name of the territory it affects," but "is a covenant, as the lawyers say, that runs with the land." That is, it binds both the United States and the Republic of Colombia, which has succeeded to the rights and obligations of New Granada.

This treaty contained the following reciprocal agreements:

"The government of New Granada guarantees to the government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may hereafter be constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States," and "as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada by the present stipulation the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus with the view that the transit from one sea to the other may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists, and *in consequence the United States also guarantee in the same manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.*"

Construing the language fairly, New Granada warrants to the United States that travel across the isthmus shall not be interrupted and the United States warrants to New Granada



her rights of sovereignty and property over the isthmus. The agreement of New Granada bound her to prevent any interference by her citizens with travel across the isthmus, and the agreement of the United States bound her to defend the sovereignty of New Granada. If either party failed to keep its engagement, a claim for damages would arise in favor of the other; and this was the clear understanding of the parties, as is shown by this provision of the treaty.

"If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied."

New Granada, in a word, agreed to protect travellers across the isthmus against interference, and to pay damages in case she failed. It was clearly her duty, and therefore her right, to use all force necessary for the purpose. In consideration of this the United States agreed to help New Granada and not to act against her. It is impossible to torture language so as to find in the treaty any right on our part to prevent her keeping order and protecting travel on her own territory, especially in the face of our "positive" and "efficacious" guaranty of her sovereignty. Such language cannot mean, "If any of your subjects revolt and so seem likely to interfere with travel, we, the United States, shall have the right to help them and prevent your asserting your sovereign rights against them."

This construction of the treaty is supported by the language of the next treaty made in 1857 which was a convention negotiated for the purpose of adjusting claims made by Americans for losses caused by a riot at Panama.

The first article of this treaty uses this language: "All claims on the part of . . . citizens of the United States upon

the government of New Granada, . . . and especially those for damages which were caused by the riot at Panama on the 15th of April, 1856, for which the said government of New Granada acknowledges its liability *arising out of its privilege and obligation to preserve peace and order along the transit route.*"

This shows where the duty and of course the right to deal with insurrection was then thought to reside by so aggressive an American as Lewis Cass, then Secretary of State.

On April 30, 1866, Secretary Seward wrote to our minister at Bogota: "The United States desire nothing else, nothing better, and nothing more in regard to the State of Colombia than the enjoyment on their part of complete and absolute sovereignty and independence. If those great interests shall ever be assailed by any power at home or abroad, the United States will be ready, co-operating with the Government and their ally, to maintain and defend them."

On October 27, 1873, Secretary Fish said in an official despatch to Mr. Keeler, referring to the provision under discussion:—

"This engagement, however, has never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protecting the road across it from the violence of local factions. Although such protection was of late efficiently given by the force under the command of Admiral Almy, it appears to have been granted with the consent and at *the instance of the local authorities*. It is, however, regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian government *to protect the road against attacks from local insurgents. The discharge of this duty will be insisted upon.*"

Secretary Bayard thus stated our position:—

"On several occasions the Government of the United States, *at the instance and always with the assent of Colombia*, has, in times of civil tumult, sent its armed forces to the Isthmus of Panama to preserve American citizens and property along the transit from injuries which the Government of Colombia might at the time be unable to prevent. But, in taking such steps, *this Government has always recog-*

*nized the sovereignty and obligation of Colombia in the premises, and has never acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has expressly disclaimed, the duty of protecting the transit against domestic disturbance."*

President Cleveland in his annual message of December, 1885, spoke thus :—

"Emergencies growing out of civil war in the United States of Colombia demanded of the government at the beginning of this Administration the employment of armed force to fulfil its guarantees under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of 1846, in order to keep the transit open across the Isthmus of Panama. Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of Colombia, the forces sent to the isthmus were instructed to confine their action to 'positively and efficaciously' preventing the transit and its accessories from being 'interrupted or embarrassed.' The execution of this delicate and responsible task necessarily involved police control where the local authority was temporarily powerless, *but always in aid of the sovereignty in Colombia.* The prompt and successful fulfilment of its duty by this government was highly appreciated by the government of Colombia, and has been followed by expressions of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on the isthmus by the re-establishment of the constituted government there being accomplished, the forces of the United States were withdrawn."

While, therefore, we had once or twice landed troops when there were riots or insurrections on the isthmus, we had done so in aid of the sovereignty of Colombia, sometimes at the request of her authorities, and always with her approval. We had insisted that upon her rested the duty of protecting the transit against attacks from insurgents, and had notified her that "the discharge of this duty will be insisted upon." Our interpretation of the treaty and our action under it had been in accordance with the clear language of the treaty. We had helped Colombia to discharge her duty and to assert her sovereignty. We had never interfered nor claimed the right to interfere against her.

There is another diplomatic precedent which should not be forgotten in this connection. I refer to the famous Ostend Manifesto. In 1854 Messrs. Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, the ministers of the United States at London, Paris, and Madrid, met at Ostend and issued a joint declaration advising the purchase of Cuba by the United States for \$120,000,000, and proceeding:—

“If Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the United States under the circumstances?”

They answered their own question by saying,—

“After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, . . . then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we have the power.”

This immoral declaration was justly condemned at the time and by none more distinctly than by the Republican party, which in its national platform in 1856 asserted the true doctrine in these words:—

“The highwayman’s plea that ‘might makes right’ embodied in the Ostend circular was in every respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction.”

We have also a statement of the true American position from President Roosevelt, who in his message to Congress in 1902 said:—

“No independent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to maintain order within its own borders and to discharge its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done, be they strong or weak, they have nothing to dread from outside interference.”

Surely there is nothing in these words to indicate that a nation whose sovereignty we had expressly guaranteed was in a less favorable position than other American nations.

These precedents show what we had considered our obligations to Colombia under the treaty of 1846, and how aggression on a weak power was regarded by the Republican party at its birth and by its present official chief, while we may recall the peaceful declaration of Secretary Hay that our conduct to other nations is regulated "by the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule."

Let us now compare these avowed principles with the recent action of our government. Within the dominions of Colombia lies the half-finished Panama canal, begun under a concession from that government to a French company. This concession in terms provided that the company might transfer it to another company or individuals, but "not to any foreign nation or government." This was a reasonable condition, as no nation could afford to admit another nation into its territory as the owner of such a canal without a very distinct understanding as to the respective rights of each. The French company became involved, and finally after much negotiation the United States agreed to buy its rights for \$40,000,000, but in order to go on with the work it was necessary to reach some agreement with Colombia.

Colombia was enjoying from the trans-isthmian railroad an income of about \$600,000, which was an important part of her revenues. Her two cities of Panama and Colon owe their prosperity to the fact that they are the termini of steamship lines, where goods and passengers are embarked and disembarked for transit from ocean to ocean. When the canal is built, they become way-stations by which steamers will sail, taking from them perhaps some small supplies, but otherwise contributing little or no business to their citizens. Colombia, therefore, had a right to some compensation for the loss which she would probably sustain from the building of the canal, and it was vital to her that the relations between her government as sovereign over the territory, and the United States as the owner of the canal, should be defined clearly and satisfactorily. A great power is a dangerous subject of a weaker nation.

The Hay-Herran treaty was an attempt to reach a satisfactory agreement on all these points, but it was rejected by the Colombian legislature, as our Senate rejected the Hay-Pauncefote treaty and the many other treaties which are buried in that "graveyard of treaties." A conspicuous case was the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty for the settlement of the "Alabama" claims, which was given but a scant consideration because we could not present such large claims under it as we thought should be presented.

The Colombian Senate acted strictly within its rights, and we have no more right to abuse the citizens of that Republic or their representatives because they did so, than England had to abuse us for endangering the peace between two great nations by rejecting the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, or than any man has to denounce another for refusing to sell his property at the price which the first wishes to pay for it. As a matter of fact, the provisions regulating the jurisdiction of Colombia over the canal were very unsatisfactory. It is from *Harper's Weekly* that I quote the following:—

"The Hay-Herran treaty was unsatisfactory on these grounds: first, the lease was not perpetual, but renewable at long intervals; secondly, the canal zone leased was too narrow; thirdly, a conflict of jurisdiction within the canal zone seemed inevitable by reason of the complexity of the provisions of the convention."

Is it necessary to assume that the Colombians were actuated only by base motives in refusing to admit their powerful and not too careful neighbor into their territory until this complexity was removed? When a supporter of the President's policy thus describes the rejected treaty, it is safe to infer that the Senate of Colombia could give good reasons for refusing to accept it! With any powerful nation we should have begun fresh negotiations; but Colombia was weak, and a different course suggested itself to our rulers.

Let me state it in the words which President Roosevelt intended to use in his annual message to Congress:—

"It seems evident that in a matter such as this we should

finally decide which is the best route ; and, if the advantages of this route over any other possible route are sufficiently marked, we should then give notice that we can no longer submit to trifling or insincere dealing on the part of those whom the accident of position has placed in temporary control of the ground through which the route must pass : that, if they will come to agreement with us in straightforward fashion, we shall, in return, act not only with justice, but with generosity ; and that, if they fail to come to such agreement with us, we must forthwith take the matter into our own hands."

Can any one point out the difference between this doctrine and that of the Ostend Manifesto? There our right to seize Cuba, if Spain refused to sell it, was placed upon "the law of self-preservation." The President would have placed our right to take a canal zone on "sufficiently marked advantages" of the Panama route over other routes. Spain's probable refusal to sell Cuba was attributed to "stubborn pride and a false sense of honor." Colombia's rejection of our offer was to be treated as "trifling or insincere dealing." In both cases we were to take by force what the owner refused to sell at a price fixed by us, which in our own opinion was just and generous.

While the administration was in this mood, occurred what Mr. Hay calls "the sudden and startling events which have so recently attracted the attention of this country and of the world."

His account of these events may be quoted from his statement to the country made on November 7. The people of Panama, he tells us, "went to work with that talent for prompt and secret organization to which there is no parallel among people of Northern blood. They prepared the machinery of revolution in advance, and suddenly in a single day without the firing of a shot — with the exception of a few shells that were thrown into the city from a Colombian steamer in the harbor of Panama — they accomplished their independence. A government, consisting of the leading

citizens of the State, was at once organized and proclaimed to the world. A part of the Colombian forces joined the revolution: the rest returned to Colombia; and, so far as we are able to judge, the new republic begins its career with no organized opposition throughout the entire extent of the Isthmus."

There is no word in all this to indicate that this revolution was not as sudden and startling to him as to the country, or that the success of the revolution was in any way due to the United States.

He proceeds: "The course of the President in this conjunction was marked out in advance by our principles and precedents. He gave orders that traffic from one side of the Isthmus to the other should be kept unimpeded by either party, and charged our officers in the Isthmus to use their utmost influence" (and "influence" is a pleasant, peaceful word) "to prevent any attack by one of the contending factions upon the other which would be calculated to cause a disturbance of traffic. When it was reported to him that a government capable of maintaining order had been established and was working without opposition, he did what was always done under such circumstances. He directed our representative at Panama, as soon as he was certain that a government capable of maintaining the public peace had been established by the consent of the people, that he was to enter into official relations with it. He also directed our minister at Bogota to inform the Colombian Government that we had entered into relations with the new provisional Government of Panama."

We may note, in passing, that our representative was instructed to enter into relations with the new government when he became satisfied of certain things; but the administration did not wait for his report on this question, and immediately informed the government of Colombia that relations had actually been established with the new State.

Now what were the facts?

The insurrection broke out late in the evening of November 3.



On June 9 Mr. Hay cabled our minister at Bogota: "If Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification, the friendly understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of Colombia would regret."

On October 24 the cruiser "Dixie" was ordered to put to sea at once with 400 marines in addition to her regular crew, and it was reported that she was sent to Guantanamo, but in fact she went to Colon.

On November 2 the Navy Department cabled to the commander of the "Nashville" at Colon:—

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad, prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other points."

The same orders were sent to the commanders of the "Boston" and "Dixie," while to Admiral Glass at Acapulco was sent the following:—

"Proceed with all possible despatch to Panama. Telegraph in cipher your departure. Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line. Prevent landing of any armed force, either government or insurgent, with hostile intent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intent of any armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. If the 'Wyoming' would delay 'Concord' or 'Marblehead,' her disposition must be left to your discretion. Government force reported approaching the isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing, if in your judgment landing would precipitate a conflict."

These orders were given to a force which had been gathered at and near the isthmus before any insurrection had occurred.

On the next day, November 3, at 3.40 P.M., the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, sent to our consul at Panama this despatch:—

"Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep department promptly and fully informed."

At 8.15 on the same day the consul replied: "No uprising yet. Reported will be to-night. Situation is critical."

About an hour and a half later the revolution occurred, and the department was informed of the "sudden and startling event" for which the government had made such complete preparations in advance.

On the night of November 2, 1903, Captain Hubbard of the "Nashville" reports that he allowed four or five hundred Colombian troops to land at Colon, not feeling justified in preventing them as the insurrection had not broken out, though he knew it was imminent, for he telegraphed on November 3 to the Navy Department, "It is possible that movement may be made at Panama to-night to declare independence." At 8.20 P.M. on the 3d the landing of these troops was reported to the State Department. At 8.45 P.M. the department replied, "The troops which landed from the 'Carthagena' should not proceed to Panama." *An hour later came the first news of the insurrection.*

The Colombian generals in command went to Panama on November 3, and were seized when the revolution began. "Except to a few people" nothing was known of this in Colon till the morning train arrived from Panama on the 4th; but on the 3d Captain Hubbard went ashore, and learned what had happened and that the Colombian generals wanted their troops sent across to Panama. On the 3d Captain Hubbard refused to allow this, and early on the 4th he gave written notice that they could not leave. On the afternoon of the 4th he ordered a force from the Nashville ashore, and took possession of the railroad station, so that the Colombian troops could not move. The Colombian troops withdrew to a hill outside while their colonel sent a messenger to Panama, who was to return on the 5th. Hubbard occupied Colon on the 5th, and the Colombian troops were confronted by our marines, and on the afternoon of the 5th, reports Captain Hubbard, their colonel "was finally persuaded to embark . . . and return to 'Carthagena.'"

Now let us compare the language of Secretary Hay: "*They* prepared the machinery of revolution in advance. . . . *They* accomplished their independence. . . . A part of the Colombian forces joined the revolution: the rest returned to Colombia."

The machinery of revolution was on board our gunboats. It was our forces that accomplished the independence of Panama. We cannot doubt for a moment that Dr. Manuel Amador spoke the truth when he said in the *Independent* last week,—

"Of course we expected that the United States would not let the Colombian troops attack us."

Who gave him the right to expect this?

What is the government now called "the new republic"? A self-constituted junta of three men. Who is their representative in Washington? A French engineer connected with the French Canal Company, appointed by the three. They have no courts, no constitution, no frame of government, no legislature, no evidence of popular assent.

"So far as we are able to judge, the new republic," says Secretary Hay, "begins its career with no organized opposition throughout the entire extent of the isthmus."

Why? Because the United States withstood the forces of the government, forbade them to fire, and forced them to leave the isthmus. The organized opposition of the Colombian government was paralyzed by our superior force. It takes a few days to organize a new opposition. The insurrection began on the night of the 3d. Secretary Hay's statement was issued on the 7th.

That opposition exists, and the reason why it is not organized may be gathered from the news brought by passengers on the "Alliance" from Colon and telegraphed from New York on December 1.

"It was denied that the prisons were filled with political prisoners, but about 130 persons in all, it was said, were deported for showing discontent."

A government of three men have already banished one

hundred and thirty for showing discontent, and this arbitrary junta is called a republic. Surely, these men do not feel very secure of their fellow-citizens, or they could afford to neglect a few malcontents. With the forces of the United States behind the junta, their fellow-citizens cannot resist them if they would.

On the 5th the United States received from Panama a formal announcement, signed by the three persons calling themselves a junta, that the Republic of Panama was established.

On the 6th the new government of Panama is recognized. Thus reads the despatch of that date to our minister at Bogota :—

“The people of Panama, having by an apparently unanimous movement dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and having adopted a government of their own, republican in form.”

Since when was a self-elected junta of three, supported by foreign bayonets against their lawful rulers, not elected by the people, and with absolute power unfettered by constitutional restraint, a government “republican in form”? What did our government know as to the sentiments of the people of Panama in less than two days after this junta had seized the power?

On the 17th of November the commissioners from the junta sent to negotiate a new treaty reached this country. The treaty was ready for them when they reached Washington; and it was negotiated, signed, and sealed between lunch and dinner. Its first article is as follows :—

“The United States guarantees and agrees to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.”

Its second article cedes to the United States a strip of land across the isthmus.

The treaty is sent to the junta for ratification. The ten million dollars which Colombia rejected is now to be paid to Panama, and on December 2d the junta ratifies the treaty.

All this has been done against the protest of Colombia, prevented by the forces of the United States from quelling the revolt at once, and now notified that the United States will resist any attempt by it to assert that sovereignty which the United States by solemn treaty agreed "practically and efficaciously" to maintain.

These facts are undisputed. They appear by official documents. It is not necessary to point out that the revolution was hatched in New York. It is not necessary to inquire whether the revolutionists consulted Mr. Hay in September, informed him that the outbreak was "scheduled to take place on September 23," and were advised to postpone it, as is stated in the New York papers. We know that the plan was known to our authorities in advance, that they prepared to aid the revolutionists by force, that they did so, and that to their interposition the success of the revolution is due.

It is clear that our action is in distinct violation of our solemn treaty. Its language is plain, and the obvious interpretation of that language is sustained by our action under previous administrations.

It is clear that, if there had been no treaty, our action would have been in flagrant violation of international law. Our mere recognition of the new government as and when it was made was unjustified.

To quote three authorities; John Quincy Adams in dealing with the question of recognizing the South American Republics said to President Monroe: "There is a stage in such contests when recognition of independence may be granted without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when independence is established as a matter of fact so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate."

Charles Sumner, in an elaborate speech on the action of England in recognizing the Southern Confederacy as a belligerent, after a careful review of the precedents, said: —

"The conclusion, then, is clear. To justify recognition, it must appear beyond doubt that *de facto the contest is finished*,

and that *de facto* the new government is established secure within fixed limits. *These are conditions precedent*, not to be avoided without open offence to a friendly power, and open violation of that International Law which is the guardian of the world's peace."

"Armed recognition is simply recognition by coercion. It is a belligerent act, constituting war, and can be vindicated only as war. . . . But an attempt under guise of recognition to coerce the dismemberment or partition of a country is in its nature offensive beyond ordinary war."

In his message of April 11, 1898, Mr. McKinley, seeking to justify his refusal to recognize the independence of Cuba, said : —

"They are evidences that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state shall 'constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability,' and forming *de facto*, 'if left to itself, a state among the nations reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state'), has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is NOT DUE TO A REVOLTED DEPENDENCY UNTIL THE DANGER OF ITS BEING SUBJUGATED BY THE PARENT STATE HAS ENTIRELY PASSED AWAY."

It is impossible to say that on November 6 the government of Panama was such a government as Mr. McKinley described, or that the danger of its being subjugated by Colombia had passed away, when Colombia had hardly learned that an insurrection had occurred.

Remember our denunciation of England's action during the Civil War. Remember our repeated refusals to recognize Cuba, our long delay in recognizing the South American republics, our action toward the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, our denial that the Philippine Republic existed, though it had legislature, courts, schools, and the devoted support of a whole people, and then tell me where are

the precedents which justify the administration's course. It is a gross violation of international law. It is the doctrine of the Ostend Manifesto adopted and put in force by the government of the United States. It is war.

International law has no meaning, if it does not bind the strong nation in its dealings with the weak,—if it is obeyed only when it is dangerous to disobey it. That great system of jurisprudence built up by the labors of enlightened statesmen and jurists during centuries rests upon principles of eternal justice; and, if its rules can be set aside from motives of interest or ambition whenever a great people or its rulers for the moment desire, there is no international law save “the highwayman's plea that ‘might makes right.’” It should be the highest ambition of our great republic to be a leader among the peoples in scrupulous regard for the rights of the weak rather than in the reckless exercise of overwhelming power at their expense.

But we want the canal. That is true, but not at any cost. We want many good things in this world. We should like to see property more equally divided. We should like to see land held by men who would use it best for the interests of all rather than by the shiftless and inefficient. We should like to see criminals promptly punished. We should like to see men who have plundered their neighbors compelled to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. We should like to see corrupt politicians driven from public life. But we do not believe in securing these good things by lawless violence. We wish ours to be “a government of laws, and not of men.” We believe in courts, not in irresponsible despotism; and we refuse to let the most honest reformer redistribute our property or punish our criminals as he thinks best. The crying evil of the time is the tendency of men to make their desires the standard for other men's duties, and to consider their wills backed by their hands a substitute for law. It is not safe to let a strong man decide what is just to the weak. Such a doctrine means anarchy. Justice is the same for individuals and nations, and a great power has no more right to rob a weak one than the prize-fighter has to plunder the minister.

The course of the administration is wrong legally and morally.

It violates at once the solemn obligations of a treaty and the well-settled rules of international law. It teaches the weaker republics of this hemisphere to distrust and fear us, and to adopt perhaps the Mexican proverb, "There is no such wolf as the shameless Yankee." It tarnishes the fair name of this country among the nations of the world. It establishes a precedent which is sure in the future to embarrass us. It sets an unhappy example of lawlessness to our citizens, already too prone to disregard the law at the dictates of passion or interest. Far worse than all these it lowers the moral standard of our whole people, since many just and honest men struggle to apologize for action which their consciences disapprove and which, if taken by Germany or England, they would indignantly condemn, either because they confound their country with the politicians who represent it and believe that patriotism compels them to defend whatever these politicians do, or because they feel bound to stand by their party, right or wrong, and to put their party above their country.

Hear the voice of a friendly English journal : —

"We regret exceedingly that President Roosevelt has allowed the fair name of his Administration to be smirched by a transaction so utterly at variance with the most elementary principles of public law and international morality. We cannot conceive a more lamentable outrage on the public conscience of the civilized world." (*London Graphic*.)

If you prefer American testimony, you may find it in the history of Mr. Rhodes, where, speaking of the Ostend Manifesto, he said its sentiments were "abhorrent to justice and at war with the opinion of the civilized world."

Emerson has well stated the universal law : —

"The end for which man was made was not crime in any form ; and a man cannot steal without incurring the penalties of the thief, though all the legislatures vote that it is virtuous, and though there be a general conspiracy among scholars and



official persons to hold him up, and to say, 'Nothing is good but stealing.'"

It would be better for this country, for its teachers and its young scholars, if we had taken the isthmus by open force than it is to take it as it has been taken, while pretending that our course is justified by international law and public morals. Robbery is wrong, but it lacks the element of mean hypocrisy which attends obtaining goods by false pretences. Open robbery also is recognized as wrong, and is condemned; but, if crime is concealed by specious phrases, it goes undetected. "The world is still deceived by ornament."

It is not patriotic to defend such action. The true patriot must desire for his country that "righteousness" which "exalteth a nation." May he not jealously guard her honor, and treat as a public enemy him who would tarnish it? It is by such acts as this that a nation loses its greatest strength, the strength which our country once enjoyed, and which comes from the respect and confidence of our fellow-men. We have the same right and the same duty that the first Republican National Convention exercised and discharged when it declared that the Ostend Manifesto "was in every respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction."

Let us strive to save our country from such shame and dishonor now by vigorously protesting against the spoliation of Colombia, and let us urge our countrymen to believe that a deserved reputation for scrupulously regarding the rights of others—a sincere belief in justice—is worth more than all the dollars which can be piled upon our broad territory.

*E. J. M.*

